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Abstract: Not only committing errors, but also observing errors has been shown to activate the dorsal
medial prefrontal cortex, particularly BA 8 and adjacent rostral cingulate zone (RCZ). Currently, there
is a debate on whether this activity reflects a response to the incorrectness of the committed action or
to its unexpectedness. This article reports two studies investigating whether activity in BA 8/RCZ is
due to the unexpectedness of observed errors or the incorrectness of the specific observed action. Both
studies employed an action observation paradigm reliant on the observation of an actor tying sailing
knots. The reported behavioral experiment delivered evidence that the paradigm successfully induced
the expectation of incorrect actions as well as the expectation of correct actions. The functional mag-
netic resonance imaging study revealed that unexpectedly correct as well as unexpectedly incorrect
actions activate the BA 8/RCZ. The same result was confirmed for a coordinate in the vicinity that has
been previously reported to be activated in separate studies either by the error observation or by the
unexpectedness of committed errors, and has been associated with the error-related negativity. The
present results suggest that unexpectedness has an impact on the medial prefrontal correlate of
observed errors. Hum Brain Mapp 00:000–000, 2013. VC 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
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INTRODUCTION
How the brain perceives and codes for errors is a long-
standing debate of neuroscientific research. As a sideline,
some studies have investigated the similarities and differ-
ences between errors and observed errors [Bates et al.,
2005; Behrens et al., 2008; de Bruijn et al., 2009; Koban
et al., 2010; Miltner et al., 2004; Schie et al., 2004; Yu and
Zhou, 2006]. None of these paradigms have focused on
one particular point: other agents’ errors are usually unex-
pected by the observer.
Some studies have investigated the neural correlates of
observed as opposed to committed errors [Bates et al.,
2005; Behrens et al., 2008; de Bruijn et al., 2009; Koban
et al., 2010; Miltner et al., 2004; van Schie et al., 2004; Yu
and Zhou, 2006]. Like many studies on error commission,
these studies on error observation typically found activity
associated with the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) [Beh-
rens et al., 2008; de Bruijn et al., 2009; van Schie et al.,
2004]. However, given the recent results that propose that
the neural correlates of error commission are rooted in the
unexpectedness of errors [Alexander and Brown, 2011; Oli-
veira et al., 2007; Wessel et al., 2012], one aspect of error
observation demands attention: usually, observed errors
cannot be fully predicted. This is very important as action
observation relies on internal forward models [Flanagan
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and Johansson, 2003; Keysers and Perrett, 2004; Kilner et al.,
2004]. Many studies in humans and macaques suggest that
internal forward models constantly deliver predictions on
the actions that are most likely to be perceived next
[Flanagan and Johansson, 2003; Keysers and Perrett, 2004;
Kilner et al., 2004; Schubotz et al., 2012; Zacks et al., 2011]. If
the observed agent commits an error, this would naturally
present an unexpected event to the observer [Schiffer and
Schubotz, 2011]. The only instance in which an error would
be probabilistically, if not temporally, expected is if the
probability of the observed agent committing an error was
high; in this case an observer could be surprised at a lack of
error (for illustrative purposes, think of a Laurel and Hardy
movie). However, in all implemented experimental settings
[Bates et al., 2005; Behrens et al., 2008; de Bruijn et al., 2009;
Koban et al., 2010; Miltner et al., 2004; Schie et al., 2004; Yu
and Zhou, 2006], and in our natural environment, errors are
less common than successful actions. This makes (another
agent’s) errors unexpected and could explain the mPFC cor-
relate of observed errors.
This study was set up to determine whether unexpected-
ness of observed actions would activate the medial BA8/ros-
tral cingulate zone (RCZ). The rationale of the study was
that to achieve the dissemination of an unexpectedness
effect in action observation, it needs to be separated from
the correctness of the observed action. To test this unexpect-
edness effect, we created probabilistic expectations of correct
actions and incorrect actions. Actions that were expected to
be performed correctly could either turn out correct
(expected) or incorrect (unexpected). Actions that were
expected to be performed incorrectly could either turn out
correct (unexpected) or incorrect (expected). In a behavioral
study, we first established that the paradigm does firmly es-
tablish these expectations. For the functional magnetic reso-
nance imaging (fMRI) study, we hypothesized that the
unexpectedness of both observed correct and observed
incorrect actions causes activity in the medial BA 8/RCZ.
METHODS
Both the behavioral and the fMRI study employed the
same stimulus material and very similar paradigms. We
will therefore first give a comprehensive introduction to
the common setup of both studies (refer also to Fig. 1).
Two separate descriptions in greater detail and with a
focus on the analyses we employed will then succeed. The
main goal of the behavioral study was to test whether it is
possible to implicitly create the expectations that either (a)
another agent will commit an error or (b) another agent
will perform an action correctly. The basic idea of the
fMRI study was to investigate the neural responses to
violated expectations on whether another agent would
perform a correct action or commit an error. The studies
were approved by the local ethics committee of the West-
fa¨lische Wilhelms-Universita¨t Mu¨nster and in line with the
Declaration of Helsinki.
Stimulus Material
Both studies employed the videos of an actress tying
sailing, climbing, and fishing knots. Using these knots as
stimulus material offers a number of advantages that mov-
ies of everyday actions do not possess:
1. It is very difficult, if not impossible, for an actor to
intentionally perform erroneous actions in a natural
way. We trained the actress to the same extent in
tying incorrect and correct knots, counterbalancing
whether she would learn the correct or incorrect
version first. This allowed us to create movies that
contained natural looking errors.
2. On a related note, the errors in the knot movies could
not be anticipated before they occurred; a danger of
intentionally incorrect everyday actions is the possi-
bility that the observer could pick up on differences
between a natural action and an intentionally errone-
ous action before the error occurs. The knot movies,
therefore, provide the possibility of timing the onset
of the unexpected event.
3. Using colored ropes (four different colors: yellow,
green, red, and blue) in the action movies allowed
implementing a salient cue during implicit learning
whether an action would be performed correctly or
not (e.g., red bowline: error; blue cleat hitch: correct).
An implementation in real-life actions (e.g., always
dropping the red kettle) would have more far-reach-
ing semantic or episodic implications.
4. Real-life errors can be of various severities, reaching
from small imperfections in motor trajectories to
dropping a Ming vase. The knots allowed to imple-
ment a fixed subset of error types: (a) incorrect repeti-
tions of one action step, (b) incorrect skipping of an
action step, and (c) performing an action step that is
not part of the present knot. They also allowed us to
control the error’s severity in terms of action out-
come. No incorrect knot had a disastrous outcome.
5. In close keeping with the last point, people may differ
on what they perceive as an error, and what they
would generously call a correct action. Knots can be
clearly defined as correct or incorrect. We trained par-
ticipants to perform knots correctly and controlled
their ability to detect errors to achieve an objective
measure.
The videos were shot from the first-person perspective,
with the camera mounted over the actress’ head. The vid-
eos showed the actress’ lower arms and hands, a board
with a cleat fixed to it and the rope the actress was using.
Each single knot (16) was filmed 18 times in every color
combination (four colors, and white), one time in the cor-
rect and one time in the erroneous version. This allowed
us to use each single movie only once, even if the condi-
tion (e.g., red bowline, incorrect) was shown 10 times
over the course of the experiment. This approach was
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Figure 1.
Comparison of the design of the behavioral study (left column) and fMRI study (right column).
The behavioral experiment consisted of the naı¨ve forced-choice task, SDT and postexperimental
forced-choice task. The fMRI study included the same type of SDT, followed by the fMRI session
that implemented an implicit task (judgment on the number of included action steps).
AQ1
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taken to minimize surface similarities between repetitions
that could otherwise account for some of the neural sig-
nal measured toward violated expectations. For each
movie of each knot, we individually assessed the point in
time when it became apparent that the knot would be
performed correctly or incorrectly. At this point, it was
clearly apparent for 14 out of the 16 knots, which one
was presently tied in the video. Two knots had a very
similar beginning, but for those knots we took care in the
randomization that the color codes would guarantee that
participants could determine which knot they presently
saw.
Behavioral Training—Behavioral and fMRI Study
Both the behavioral study and the fMRI study involved
the same type of training. In a 1-h session, participants
were trained to tie 8 out of the 16 knots. Training was
based on the photographs of the eight knots. Each knot
was presented action step by action step, each one on a
separate photograph. The photographs showed tying of
the knot with the white rope. The other eight knots of the
set of 16 were watched only during training. In these
training videos, the knots were tied with a white rope.
All videos showed the correct version of the respective
knot. Which subset was practiced by tying the knots
(motor condition) and which subset was only visually
trained (imagery condition) was counterbalanced across
participants, with two sets of equally difficult knots. The
division between imagery condition and motor condition
was implemented because we assumed that most knots
that were later shown in their error version had never
been practised/acted out in this error version before.
This would confound error knots with untied knots.
Using an imagery condition allowed deconfounding the
influence of no history of tying the knot in the observed
fashion (lack of motor model) and the influence of the
incorrectness per se. Participants received a CD contain-
ing the training videos and the training photographs,
written stepwise descriptions of all 16 knots, a board
with a cleat mounted onto it, and two white ropes to take
home. Participants were instructed to spend overall 10 h
between the training session and the experimental session
learning the knots. The knots in the motor condition were
to be practiced during 5 h of these training hours. The
knots in the imagery condition were to be watched for 5
h on video-implementing motor imagery (refer the fol-
lowing sections also). Participants were strictly advised
never to tie the knots from the videos. The instruction
concerning this visually trained subset was that they
should engage in motor imagery. That is, they were told
to watch one video, close their eyes, imagine the knot
step by step, and then watch the video again to check if
they had imagined the knot correctly. The written
description of each knot that accompanied the photo-
graphs as well as the movies emphasized the number of
action steps that each knot should be divided into. Partic-
ipants were told that they would be tested on their
knowledge of the knots and would only receive full com-
pensation if they had perfect knowledge of all of the
knots (they did not know that there would be a motor
test).
Subjects
Participants either partook in the pilot or in the fMRI
session. No participant did both experiments. Out of the
23 healthy participants (17 female, age, 20–48 years, mean
[M] ¼ 25.39, standard deviation [SD] ¼ 7.82), who took
part in the pilot study, one was excluded from further
analyses owing to insufficient performance (below 2 SDs
from mean). Four sets of data were inadvertently deleted
after a computer failure and were thus not included. The
data from the remaining 18 participants (14 female, age
20–48 years, M ¼ 25.33, SD ¼ 8.49) were included in all
further analyses. Sixteen healthy participants (11 female,
age 20–28 years, M ¼ 23.25, SD ¼ 2.46) took part in the
fMRI study. Only 15 participants were included in final
analyses (11 female, age 20–28 years, M ¼ 23.4, SD ¼
2.47), as one participant was excluded from all analyses
owing to poor performance during the fMRI. All partici-
pants in the behavioral study and 12 out of the 15 partici-
pants in the fMRI study worked for course credit. They
could earn up to 10 h of course credit for correct per-
formance of all 16 knots. They would get half an hour
less course credit for each knot that they could not per-
form. Participants were paid in course credit for the
training sessions in the behavioral study and the fMRI
study and received 20 Euro for participation in the fMRI
session.
Behavioral Study
The behavioral study session was subdivided into four
parts. The first part consisted of an assessment of the
subjects’ proficiency in tying the 16 knots (motor test).
To that end, participants were filmed while tying the
knots as fast as they possibly could and later rated by
two independent raters according to a predefined set of
criterions, for example, correctness of the result, motor
fluency, and number of self-corrections. The time-empha-
sizing instruction was used to heighten error likelihood
and achieve a more critical measure of performance pro-
ficiency. Only participants who could tie more than eight
knots without any errors were allowed to continue in the
experiment.
Naı¨ve forced-choice task
The second part of the behavioral session consisted of a
forced-choice task on the knot movies (Fig. 1). Two differ-
ent color versions of each knot were presented. The two
versions were either both error versions, both correct
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versions, or one correct and one error version The appear-
ance of all knots in the two color version was pseudo-ran-
domly distributed across the length of the experiment.
These movies stopped 500 ms before the movements
between correct and incorrect versions of one knot
diverged. Participants had to press one of the two
response buttons to indicate whether they predicted the
movie to later contain an error or not (‘‘Will she make an
error?’’). This task served the purpose of determining
whether the actress’ intention to commit an error was visi-
ble prior to error occurrence. We recorded the standard
measures of signal detection theory [Green and Swets,
1974] to estimate d prime, an indication of participants’
ability to discriminate signal trials (incorrectly tied knots)
from other trials (correct knots). We hypothesized that d
primes would yield no indication of an ability to predict
whether the knots would turn out incorrectly or correctly
(during the not-displayed ending).
Signal detection task
After the forced-choice task, participants entered the sig-
nal detection task (SDT) (Fig. 1). They again watched vid-
eos of the knots being tied, but this time, the entire length
of the video was shown. Each knot appeared in two differ-
ent color versions (e.g., red and blue). These two versions
were either both error versions, both correct versions, or
one correct and one error version. Each version appeared
in five different shots, that is, although participants
watched, for example, the yellow incorrectly tied bowline
five times over the course of the experiment, each single
movie was another shot of the same content. For each
knot, it was randomly assigned whether it would be
shown in the correct or in the error version and what color
the rope had. The randomization assured that each rope
color would appear equally often with correct or error
knots. During this task, participants were required to press
a button whenever they detected an incorrectly tied knot.
This task was aimed at two principal goals: we used the
task as a pre-exposition of knot/color/correctness combi-
nations to ultimately test in the fourth part of the experi-
ment whether participants would learn implicit
expectations on the correctness of each color/knot combi-
nation. At the same time, the SDT delivered a test for the
participants’ ability to differentiate between correct and er-
roneous knots. To measure this, we again used d primes.
In addition, we measured reaction times over repetitions,
to assess learning. Reaction times were taken as the time
between the movie-specific point in time when correct
knots diverged from error knots and the button press
response.
We hypothesized that participants would achieve a
high d prime, indicating a good ability to detect errors
and reject correct movies. We moreover hypothesized
that learning would be reflected in decreasing reaction
times.
Postexposition forced choice task
Finally, participants underwent a repetition of the first
task with an extended set of videos (Fig. 1). Videos were
again stopped 500 ms prior to the point of divergence
between correct and incorrect knots. In total, 64 different
knot/color combinations appeared, with each knot in four
different colors. Half of the videos contained knots that
had been shown five times before in the SDT, either every
time in the correct or every time in the error version. The
other half of the videos had not been displayed in the
SDT. Participants were again asked to predict and indicate
whether the remainder of the video would contain an
error or not. This part of the experiment served the pur-
pose of assessing whether the pre-exposition created
implicit expectations, leading participants to incorrectly
predict videos they had previously witnessed to develop
erroneously to contain an error, and vice versa for the pre-
vious correct knots. The analysis rested on a comparison
of the number of history-driven responses for those mov-
ies that had been displayed in the SDT, compared with
the number of history-driven responses for the movies
that had not. In the latter case, history was defined as the
version that the group with the complimentary randomiza-
tion would have seen during the SDT. The full-factorial
model thus contained the two-level factor display in the
SDT (displayed or not displayed), the two-level-factor
influence of history (response in line with history or differ-
ent from history), and the two-level factor influence of cur-
rent version (response in line with the present movie, or
different).
We hypothesized that display and history would show
a significant interaction in explaining response behavior.
We assumed that the pre-exposition of the movie in the
SDT (display) would lead to responses in line with the his-
tory of the movie.
fMRI Study
Training and admission procedures for the fMRI study
were identical to those described in Behavioral Training—
Behavioral and fMRI Study section. For each imperfect or
unfinished knot in the motor test, participants received
half an hour course credit or 8 Euro less than the maxi-
mum of 10 h/80 Euro. Previous to the fMRI session, the
participants underwent the same assessment of their abil-
ity to tie the knots as the participants in the pilot study
(motor test). The fMRI study also employed an identical
SDT as a pre-exposition phase outside the scanner (32
color/knot combinations, each shown five times, responses
to observed errors; Fig. 1). Again, the SDT served several
purposes: first of all, it allowed us to create implicit
expectations on correctness or incorrectness of observed
knots (as will be shown in the RESULTS section of the be-
havioral study). Second, we could use the responses in the
SDT as a measure of participants’ ability to detect errors
and reject correct movies as error-free. During the fMRI,
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half of the color/knot combinations that appeared repeat-
edly correctly in the pre-exposition (8) were now dis-
played in their error version (unexpected error). The other
half (8) of the color/knot combinations that appeared
repeatedly correctly in the pre-exposition were now again
displayed in the correct version (expected correct). Half of
the color/knot combinations that always appeared errone-
ously in the pre-exposition were now displayed errone-
ously again (8) (expected error), whereas the other half
was now displayed in the correct version (8) (unexpected
correct; cf. Fig. 1). All movies were shown in full length,
no movie stopped before the correctness of the knot was
ultimately visible. The randomization that was employed
ensured that no color was correlated significantly with one
development (i.e., incorrect in pre-exposition and fMRI,
correct in pre-exposition and fMRI, switch from correct to
incorrect or vice versa between pre-exposition and fMRI).
The same logic as for the colors applied to individual
knots. The four main conditions (expected correct,
expected error, unexpected correct, and unexpected error)
contained to equal parts movies from the motor and per-
ceptual training condition. We planned two principal anal-
yses comparing unexpected correct and unexpected error
with expected correct and expected error knots. The first
was a conjunction of the two unexpectedness contrasts, as
will be described in more detail in the following sections.
The second analysis aimed to establish whether an ROI,
previously reported in the literature, to be activated by
error observation was also susceptible to the effects of
unexpectedness, dissociated from correctness. This ROI
analysis was based on a peak coordinate taken from the
study of de Bruijn et al. (2009) errors in action observation
study that was mirrored as a peak-activation in the recent
study of Wessel et al. (2012). Both our analyses were
essentially calculated from the same design matrix and
involved the same preprocessing. The analyses were sub-
mitted to corrections for multiple comparisons by permu-
tation analysis. We hypothesized that the medial BA 8,
potentially reaching into the RCZ [Ridderinkhof et al.,
2004] would be activated in the contrast.
fMRI session
During the fMRI session, participants lay supine on the
scanner bed. Their head and arms were stabilized using
form-fitting cushioning and their hands rested on a rubber
foam tablet. On the right-hand side, a response panel was
mounted on the tablet and fixed with tape. They could
respond to questions with their right-hand index and mid-
dle finger resting on two response buttons. The task-irrele-
vant questions that participants had to answer concerned
the number of action steps that the last knot they had seen
had encompassed. The last knot could, for example, have
been the bowline and the number 8 would appear on the
screen. Participants had to press the right button if they
judged the knot to have more than eight action steps and
the left button if they judged it to have less. Participants
wore earplugs to attenuate scanner noise and headphones
to listen to the experimenter. Participants saw the display
on a mirror built into the head-coil and adjusted individu-
ally to allow for comfortable view of the entire screen. The
movies extended to 5 of visual angle on the mirror image
of the computer screen. Eight null-events of 6 s length
were displayed, consisting of the display of a gray back-
ground on the screen. Participants were instructed to relax
during null-events.
Data acquisition
The functional imaging session took place in a 3T
Siemens Magnetom Trio scanner (Siemens, Erlangen,
Germany). In a separate session, prior to the functional
MRI, high-resolution 3D T-1 weighted whole-brain
MDEFT sequences were recorded for every participant
(128 slices, field of view, 256 mm; 256  256 pixel matrix,
thickness, 1 mm; spacing, 0.25 mm). The functional session
engaged a single-shot gradient echo-planar imaging
sequence sensitive to blood oxygen level-dependent
(BOLD) contrast (28 slices, parallel to the bicommisural
plane, echo time, 30 ms; flip angle, 90; repetition time,
2,000 ms; serial recording). Following the functional ses-
sion immediately, a set of T1-weighted 2D-FLASH images
was acquired for each participant (28 slices, field of view,
200 mm; 128  128 pixel matrix, thickness, 4 mm; spacing,
0.6 mm; in-plane resolution, 3 mm  3 mm).
fMRI data analysis
Functional data were offline motion-corrected using the
Siemens motion protocol PACE (Siemens, Erlangen, Ger-
many). Further processing was conducted with the LIPSIA
1.6 software package [Lohmann et al., 2001]. Cubic spline
interpolation was used to correct for the temporal offset
between the slices acquired in one scan. To remove low-
frequency signal changes and baseline drifts, a 1/120-Hz
filter was applied. The matching parameters (six degrees
of freedom, three rotational, three translational) of the
T1-weighted 2D-FLASH data onto the individual 3D
MDEFT reference set were used to calculate the transfor-
mation matrices for linear registration. These matrices
were subsequently normalized to a standardized Talairach
brain size (x ¼ 135 mm, y ¼ 175 mm, z ¼ 120 mm;
Talairach and Tournoux, 1988) by linear scaling. The
normalized transformation matrices were then applied to
the functional slices, to transform them using trilinear
interpolation, and to align them with the 3D reference set
in the stereotactic coordinate system. The generated output
thus had a spatial resolution of 3 mm  3 mm  3 mm.
The statistical evaluation was based on a least-square
estimation using the general linear model for serially
autocorrelated observations [Worsley and Friston, 1995].
Temporal Gaussian smoothing (4-s FWHM) was applied
to deal with temporal autocorrelation and determine the
degrees of freedom [Worsley and Friston, 1995]. Spatial
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smoothing of 5.6 mm FWHM was applied. The design
matrix was generated by hemodynamic modeling using a
d-function (stick function). The design matrix encompassed
the following events: unexpected correct knot movies,
unexpected error knot movies, expected correct knot mov-
ies, expected error knot movies, and null-events. The onset
that was modeled in the design matrix was exactly the
movie or null-event onset. All events were modeled with
an amplitude vector of 1. The entire movie length was
modeled for each knot movie and the null-events were
modeled by their actual length of 6 s.
Whole-brain analysis (conjunction analysis)
To test for the shared effects of unexpectedness, we
employed a conjunction analysis. Conjunction analyses
deliver a possibility to ensure that both comparisons con-
tribute to the final activity pattern. The analysis consisted
of the overlay of the contrasts (unexpected correct >
expected correct) \ (unexpected error > expected error).
The conjunction of contrasts was performed at a probabil-
ity level of P ¼ 0.05 threshold and only activations higher
than z ¼ 2.0 are reported. As a follow-up test, we used an
ROI analysis that employed a jack-knife correction to pre-
vent double-dipping [Egner, 2011; Kriegeskorte et al.,
2009] and a permutation analysis for second-level correc-
tions (Fig. 2, Nichols and Holmes, 2002; Nichols et al.,
2005). The jack-knife approach rests on an iterative leave-
one-out technique (Fig. 3). This technique estimates the
peak voxel in a contrast n times (n, number of subjects),
each time with one of the subjects excluded from the anal-
ysis. The peak voxel that is estimated without the specific
subject is then applied as a ROI to the subject that was left
out [Egner, 2011; Nee and Brown, in press]. We used the
peak voxel from the (leave-one-out) conjunction analyses
to estimate the mean b for each subject (the respective left-
out-subject) in both original contrasts that made up the
conjunction. The two samples of mean bs for the popula-
tion of subjects were then fed into a permutation analysis
[Nichols and Holmes, 2002; Schiffer et al., 2012]. The per-
mutation analysis employed 30,000 random assignments of
mean bs to estimate the true distribution of betas in the
ROI. This bootstrapping approach does not necessitate the
assumption of a Gaussian distribution within an ROI and
it does not artificially boost the power of activity in small
ROIs [Nichols and Holmes, 2002]. It is, hence, more con-
servative than other second-level corrections for multiple
comparisons. We expected an increased BOLD signal in
the RCZ, bordering the medial BA 8 for unexpectedness,
deconfounded from the correctness or incorrectness of the
action. We expected that we would be able to substantiate
this result in both contrasts that entered the conjunction
analysis in the combined jack-knife permutation analysis
approach, delivering a significant result, corrected for
Figure 2.
Overview of the analysis steps for the ROI analysis based on the whole-brain conjunction and the literature-based ROI analysis.
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multiple comparisons both for unexpected correct and for
unexpected error knots.
Literature-based ROI
The second ROI analysis was planned in case that the
mPFC peak voxel of the conjunction analysis would not
coincide with the peak voxel reported previously for
observed errors. The motivation for this further analysis
was twofold: first of all, we wanted to test whether our
data are consistent with the recent literature of error proc-
essing [Wessel et al., 2012] that emphasizes the unexpect-
edness account. Furthermore, we wanted to test whether
the explanation of unexpectedness provides an alternative
to the explanation of incorrectness for coordinates reported
for the processing of other agents’ errors [de Bruijn et al.,
2009]. De Bruijn and colleagues reported that errors, either
of the individual itself or observed by the individual,
lead to an activation around the peak coordinate at x ¼ 4,
y ¼ 33, z ¼ 42 in MNI space. Wessel and colleagues
reported a similar (albeit left lateralized) peak coordinate
for unexpected events (errors and novel items) at x ¼ 6,
y ¼ 33, z ¼ 42 in MNI space. For the purpose of the ROI
analysis, we transposed the MNI coordinates to Talairach
space, using the program mni2tal.m, run on Matlab 2010a
(The Mathworks). The resulting Talairach coordinates
were x ¼ 4, y ¼ 28, z ¼ 38 (corresponding to de Bruijn
et al., 2009) and x ¼ 4, y ¼ 28, z ¼ 32 (corresponding to
Wessel et al., 2012). Both coordinates and three surround-
ing voxels (i.e., a 27 mm3 ROI centered on the peak coordi-
nate) entered the analysis as one ROI. We calculated the
mean b-values for every participant in the ROI in both
contrasts: (unexpected correct > expected correct) and
(unexpected error > expected error). These contrasts are
parallel to the contrasts that entered the conjunction analy-
sis in the whole-brain conjunction-derived ROI. The aim of
this analysis is thus to test for the significance of both unex-
pectedness effects in the ROI derived from the literature.
Literature-derived ROIs do not call for a leave-one-out
approach [Kriegeskorte et al., 2009]. All later steps of the
analysis were conducted in parallel to the conjunction-
derived ROI described previously (Fig. 2). The permutation
analysis of t-values in the conjunction analysis-based ROI
tests whether each entering contrast yields significant activ-
ity in this area. In the same vein, the permutation analysis
based on the literature-derived ROI tests whether the same
two contrasts each yield significant activity in the ROI taken
from the literature.
In a second approach, we calculated the mean bs for ev-
ery participant in the contrast (unexpected error \
expected error) > (unexpected correct \ expected correct)
as an additional test for a singular influence of the obser-
vations of errors. Finally, to test whether the influence of
unexpectedness would outweigh the influence of incorrect-
ness, we calculated the interaction contrast of the two
main effects (unexpected error > unexpected correct) >
Figure 3.
Leave-one-out approach: The overlap of activity on the group level of a subset of the entire
group leaving out one brain is used to extract the medial prefrontal ROI. The peak coordinates
are subsequently used to extract the mean b-value within both contrasts of the conjunction in
the left-out brain. This process is repeated for every brain to be left out—and the mean b
thereof extracted—once. Resulting bs are used in the permutation analysis.
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(expected error < expected correct). For each contrast, the
distribution of bs was then fed into a permutation analysis
of 30,000 permutations as a corrective for multiple compar-
isons. The respective t-values for both comparisons were
then compared against the critical t-value (P ¼ 0.05;
position 28,500 in the distribution) derived from the per-
mutation analysis.
We hypothesized that the ROI would be activated by
the unexpectedness of an event. We did not expect a
significant activation for the observation of errors. We
hypothesized that the effect of unexpectedness would sur-
pass the effect of incorrectness in the interaction analysis.
Explorative observed error search
In addition to the previously reported hypothesis-
driven analysis, we calculated the main effect of error
(unexpected error \ expected error) > (unexpected correct
\ expected correct) on the whole-brain level. This whole-
brain analysis was calculated for two reasons: first, as the
task in the fMRI did not yield a measure of the partici-
pants’ awareness of errors, we rely on a neuronal measure
of a difference between erroneous and correct actions.
Finding this difference would substantiate the study’s
claim to yield the results that could potentially relate to
the previous findings in error-observation studies. Second,
masking this contrast with the conjunction for unexpected-
ness at a threshold of z ¼ 1.96 allows to probe whether the
observation of errors activates the mPFC to a degree that
surpasses the activity in the conjunction of unexpected-
ness. Arguing in the same vein, we also calculated the
error contrast only for unexpected movies (unexpected
error > unexpected correct). This contrast can be under-
stood to capture the element of error, freed from the ele-
ment of unexpectedness. A significant finding in this
contrast in the described ROI (x ¼ 4, y ¼ 28, z ¼ 38) would
indicate that, at least for unexpected movies, incorrectness
itself creates a difference in the ROI. This potential finding
would again implicate incorrectness as a modulatory influ-
ence on unexpectedness area. Mean bs were taken for each
participant in the ROI and the critical t-value was deter-
mined by means of the previously described permutation
analysis.
fMRI-Post-test
The fMRI-session was followed by a brief post-test.
Participants sat in front of a laptop and saw each of the 16
knots again tied once with the white rope (i.e., the training
color), either in the correct or in the erroneous version.
Participants had to indicate whether the knot they saw
was tied correctly or incorrectly. This test was meant to
assess whether participants were still able to discern cor-
rect from incorrect knots after the pre-exposition and
fMRI. This measure is important to ensure that partici-
pants did not unlearn the knots. Only if unlearning could
be ruled out, potential error and unexpectedness effects
measured during the fMRI would remain meaningful.
RESULTS
Behavioral Study
The behavioral study was set up to assess whether we
can implicitly train subjects to expect whether another
actor would tie knots incorrectly or correctly. In total, 18
participants met the initial motor test criterion. They per-
formed on average 11 knots correctly (rounded figure; SD
¼ 3.07). These participants were then allowed to partici-
pate in the study.
Naı¨ve forced-choice task
The naı¨ve forced-choice task was implemented as a test
of the stimulus material. If participants had displayed the
ability to discriminate between incorrect and correct knots
before the error occurred in the respective movies, this
would have implied that error and correct knots were too
dissimilar and that the time point of error commission
could not be assessed precisely. However, participants’ d
primes in this task showed no evidence of the ability to
discriminate between target (error) and distractor (correct)
knots (d primes and RT, Table I). A one-sample t-test
against zero yielded a t-value of 0.2 and P > 0.05. Thus,
we got no indication of the possibility to tell these movie
types apart before the error was committed.
Signal detection task
The SDT was used to assess participants’ ability to tell
error and correct knots apart. Its implicit function was to
train specific expectations concerning the correctness or
incorrectness of specific color/knot combinations. Partici-
pants’ d primes in this task suggested a good ability to
detect error knots (d primes and RT, Table I). A t-test of
the d prime distribution against zero yielded a t-value of
10.12 and P-value of <0.05. Hence, participants were well
able to correctly identify knots either as correct or as incor-
rect knots.
TABLE I. Mean RTs in seconds (s), SD of RTs (s), and
mean d primes for all behaviorally assessed parts of the
behavioral and fMRI study
RT—mean (s) RT—SD (s) d Prime
Behavioural study
Naı¨ve forced-choice 0.93 0.18 0.09
SDT 2.42 0.57 2.33
Postexposition forced-choice 0.75 0.22 0.05
FMRI
SDT (pre-exposition) 2.72 0.51 3.86
FMRI—questions 0.93 0.29
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We calculated reaction times as another measure of
learning. Reaction times for error detection for each spe-
cific movie decreased significantly over the course of the
five repetitions (Table I). A repeated measures ANOVA
with repetition as a five-level within subject factor yielded
a significant result F(4,68) ¼ 11.015 (P < 0.05).
Postexposition forced-choice task
The postexposition forced-choice task was meant to esti-
mate whether seeing a knot in the correct or error version
during the pre-exposition would create a persistent expec-
tation that this knot would be tied in the error or correct
version (d primes and RT, Table I). A t-test of the d prime
distribution against zero yielded a t-value of 0.61 and P
> 0.05. The test for the establishment of expectations was
a repeated measures ANOVA with the three two-level
factors display (seen before, not seen before), history (in
line with response, not in line with response), and current
version (in line with response, not in line with response).
This repeated measures ANOVA yielded a significant
main effect of display with F(1,17) ¼ 9.983, a significant
interaction between the factor history and the covariate
individual d prime with F(1,17) ¼ 4.564 in the SDT and an
interaction between the factors display, history and the
covariate d prime in SDT with F(1,17) ¼ 16.869, (all P <
0.05). We thus find that the previously seen version influ-
enced the participants’ response behavior. More specifi-
cally, this influence was scaled by their responses during
the pre-exposition. Quite interestingly, participants who
had a high d prime during the SDT were less influenced
by the history of movies (which they had actually seen).
Note that the history of movies that had actually not been
displayed to the subject before (half of the movies) was set
as the history that the movie had in the other randomiza-
tion. Including history and display as factors ensured that
history effects were not owing to the fact that the actress
had at another stage performed the same knot in another
condition (possibly resulting in idiosyncratic movements
for each knot, or likewise), but that the subject has actually
been exposed to that condition. We thus find that if
participants had seen a movie in a certain condition
(correct or incorrect), this biased them toward expecting
the movie to develop in the same way (correct or incorrect,
respectively).
fMRI Study
Motor test, pre-exposition SDT, and post-MRI SDT test
In the initial motor test, participants displayed a high
ability of tying the knots, tying on average 13 knots cor-
rectly (rounded figure; SD ¼ 2.53). During the SDT that
served as a pre-exposition to the fMRI participants’ d
primes varied between 1.42 and 6.05 (d primes and RT,
Table I). Reaction times analyzed in a repeated measures
ANOVA again yielded a significant decrease (F(4,52) ¼
10.021) of RTs (P < 0.05). In the post-test that probed par-
ticipants’ uncompromised ability to tell error knots from
correct knots, participants’ d primes varied between 1.34
and 4.65 (d primes and RT, Table I). A two-tailed paired
t-test between the d prime distributions of pre- and post-
test did not yield a significant result (t ¼ 1.05; P > 0.05).
Thus, we find no indication that participants’ ability to
discern correct and incorrect knots changed.
Effect of unexpectedness: Conjunction analysis and
jack-knife permutation analysis approach
The conjunction ([unexpected correct > expected cor-
rect] \ [unexpected error > expected error]) yielded
above-threshold activity in the mPFC (medial Brodman
Area [BA] 8). This area can be understood as a transitional
zone to the RCZ (Talairach coordinates: x ¼ 7, y ¼ 37, z ¼
39; z ¼ 2.48, uncorrected). Corrections for multiple com-
parisons on the whole-brain level yielded no significant
activations (a list of activations of this contrast uncorrected
for multiple comparisons is summarized in Supporting In-
formation Table 1).
To test the statistical significance of the recorded activity
in the medial BA 8/RCZ, we implemented a jack-knife
approach as described in the METHODS section (Fig. 3).
This approach circumvents a double-dipping fallacy
[Egner, 2011; Kriegeskorte et al., 2009]. This approach was
followed by a correction for multiple comparisons by per-
mutation analysis. This analysis yielded significant effects
for both contrasts, with the (unexpected error > expected
error) - contrast yielding a t-value of 3.46, compared
against a critical t-value of 1.76 (position 28,500, P ¼ 0.05).
The (unexpected correct > expected correct) - contrast
yielded a t-value of 2.56, compared against a critical
t-value of 1.75 (position 28,500, P ¼ 0.05) (Fig. 4). Thus, we
established a significant effect of unexpectedness in the
same ROI in the RCZ both for error and for correct actions
that survived correction for multiple comparisons [Nichols
and Holmes, 2002].
Literature-based ROI analysis
The second analysis calculated the mean bs for every
participant in the literature-based ROI (x ¼ 4, y ¼ 28, z ¼
38/x ¼ 4, y ¼ 28, z ¼ 38, Talairach coordinates) for the
contrasts (unexpected correct > expected correct) and
(unexpected error > expected error). Both contrasts
yielded a significant result. The (unexpected error >
expected error) contrast reached a t-value of 2.26,
compared against a critical t-value of 1.74 (position 28,500,
P ¼ 0.05). The (unexpected correct > expected correct)
contrast reached a t-value of 1.93 compared against a criti-
cal t-value of 1.74 (Fig. 4). The main effect of the error -
contrast (unexpected error \ expected error) > (unex-
pected correct \ expected correct) yielded no evidence for
a significant BOLD increase for the observation of errors,
irrespective their unexpectedness. The critical t-value in
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this distribution was 1.72, whereas the main effect of error
reached a t-value of 0.23 in the literature-based ROI. How-
ever, not finding a main effect of error, although the null
effect was expected, does not rule out that error quality
influences the effect of unexpectedness. Investigating
whether errors in fact do not influence the unexpectedness
effect is hence better achieved by means of an interaction
contrast [Nieuwenhuis et al., 2011]. Therefore, we calcu-
lated the interaction between the two putative main
effects, the above-mentioned main effect of error and the
main effect of unexpectedness, and thus controlling for the
error effect: ([unexpected error > unexpected correct] >
[expected error < expected correct]).
This interaction analysis yielded a t-value of 1.72, and a
critical t-value of 1.76 (position 28,500, P ¼ 0.05). The
actual t-value of 1.72 took the position 28,463 in the distri-
bution, which corresponds to a P-value of 0.0512.
Although this does rule out an influence of the incorrect-
ness of the observed action on the unexpectedness effects
at P ¼ 0.05, we regard the potential error influence still as
rather unlikely. It is important to note that the test for the
reverse interaction (unexpectedness effects larger for error
than for correct actions) would not be statistically sound
as it would result in testing for evidence of the null-
hypothesis.
Explorative observed error search
The whole-brain analysis for the main effect of error
yielded activity in the inferior frontal junction, the poste-
rior intraparietal sulcus, the posterior middle temporal
gyrus, and the cerebellum (Table II) at a very lenient cor-
rection for multiple comparisons of Z ¼ 1.96. Activation in
the insula, which may be of particular interest in error-
related contrasts, was present in the uncorrected grand
averages (x ¼ 29, y ¼ 24, z ¼ 12, Talairach coordinates; z
¼ 3.007), but did not survive correction for multiple com-
parisons. Masking the main effect of error contrast with
the conjunction for unexpectedness in errors and correct
actions yielded no activity in the mPFC. Finally, the effect
of incorrectness only for unexpected actions did not signif-
icantly activate the literature-derived ROI (x ¼ 4, y ¼ 28, z
¼ 38; Talairach coordinates). The mean b distribution
derived in this ROI for that contrast (unexpected error >
unexpected correct) yielded a t-value of 0.47, with the
according critical t-value being 1.80. On the whole-brain
Figure 4.
Whole-brain activations for the conjunction analysis: (unex-
pected correct > expected correct) \ (unexpected error >
expected error). The red distributions refer to the t-values cal-
culated from the 30,000 permutations in the jack-knife-derived
ROIs. The respective critical t-value is marked by the long bar
that separates the distributions, the exact t-value is marked by
the small bar (in all cases to the right of the latter), and spelled
out on the x-coordinate. The blue distributions complementarily
show the results for the literature-based ROI permutation analy-
sis. The distributions for unexpectedly incorrect knots are in
the top row and the distributions for the unexpectedly correct
knots are in the bottom row.
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level, this contrast dealing with the effect of incorrectness
in unexpected events activate the right inferior frontal
gyrus, right inferior temporal junction, right ventral pre-
motor cortex, right temporoparietal junction, right fusiform
gyrus, right parahippocampal gyrus, and the most anterior
superior temporal gyrus (all activations corrected for mul-
tiple comparisons at z ¼ 1.95, P ¼ 0.05).
DISCUSSION
The present fMRI study investigated whether the mPFC,
particularly BA 8/RCZ, codes for the unexpectedness of
observed actions, regardless of whether they are correct or
not. In an accompanying behavioral study, we first
ensured that implicit learning can create the expectation of
correct, as well as the expectation of incorrect actions. In
the subsequent fMRI study, we found BA 8/RCZ to code
for the unexpectedness of an observed action, regardless
of whether this action was a correct one or not. Our find-
ings suggest that activity previously reported in relation-
ship to the observation of errors [Bates et al., 2005;
Behrens et al., 2008; de Bruijn et al., 2009; Koban et al.,
2010; Miltner et al., 2004; Schie et al., 2004; Yu and Zhou,
2006] could potentially have been driven, to some extent,
by their unexpectedness.
This interpretation substantiates recent work that like-
wise implicated activity in RCZ as driven by the unexpect-
edness of events [Alexander and Brown, 2011; Holroyd
et al., 2009; Wessel et al., 2012]. Regarding error observa-
tion, however, most studies measured an event-related
potential (ERP) often associated with error commission:
the so-called error-related negativity (ERN). It is naturally
beyond the scope of this study to prove that the ERN
recorded toward observed errors in the previous studies
was owing to the unexpectedness of actions and unrelated
to the fact that they were erroneous. However, we may
suggest that unexpectedness as a characteristic of observed
errors likely contributed to the respective ERNs. We will
first investigate in how far the previous studies controlled
for the effects of unexpectedness, turn toward the ERN as
an ERP measure of error (observation), and finally discuss
the current findings with respect to the notion of
unexpectedness.
Previous Studies on Error Observation
Most studies on error observation use ERPs. These stud-
ies target the ERN, a component originally associated with
error commission [Falkenstein et al., 1991; Gehring et al.,
1993]. Thus, the error-observation ERN has been claimed
to reflect an internal error mirror system that responds to
observed errors and thus allows observational learning
[Bates et al., 2005; Koban et al., 2010; Miltner et al., 2004;
Schie et al., 2004]. Quite interestingly, neither fMRI study
[Behrens et al., 2008; de Bruijn et al., 2009] implemented
the observation of another actor, but the observation of
‘‘their’’ error feedback; the participants learned through
feedback on a computer screen whether the virtual agent
had made an error or performed the task correctly. This
rather indirect setup weakens the argument made by other
authors that the observed frontomedian activity could be a
correlate of an error-focused extension of an internal error
mirror neuron system [Bates et al., 2005; Koban et al.,
2010; Miltner et al., 2004; Yu and Zhou, 2006]. The highly
debated mirror neurons are supposed to be activated by
the perception of other people’s actions [Rizzolatti and
Sinigaglia, 2010; but cf. Csibra, 2007; Keysers and Perrett,
2004; Kilner et al., 2004] and not by a corresponding
abstract action feedback. We take this finding of outcome-
related ‘‘mirror’’ activity as a result which the error-mirror
neuron account cannot accommodate. On a related note,
the bilateral PM activity for unexpected events deserves
mentioning. The PM activity in the unexpectedness con-
trast can be interpreted as a correlate of the mismatch sig-
nal between an internal forward model of the observed
action and the bottom-up visual input. This mismatch
interpretation has been tested and reported, to some
extent, in previous studies [Schiffer et al., 2012; Schubotz,
2007; Schubotz and von Cramon, 2004].
Regarding the validity of the proposed unexpectedness
account, some previous studies on error observation did
control for unexpectedness [Bates et al., 2005; Miltner
et al., 2004]. However, in one of these studies, unexpected-
ness was implemented as immediate trial history [Bates
et al., 2005]. The study hence controlled for the possibility
that an ERN would be owing to the fact that the last
observed error/ERN had occurred some time ago, as
opposed to having occurred recently. However, it is not
quite clear whether a string of correct trials should lower
or heighten the expectation of an error trial (gambler’s fal-
lacy). Moreover, it appears as if each series length of cor-
rect trials between two incorrect (ERN eliciting) trials
occurred equally often [Bates et al., 2005]. This balanced
TABLE II. List of highest peaks of activation for the
main effect of error (unexpected error \ expected
error) > (unexpected correct \ expected correct)
including anatomical location, Talairach coordinates of






Inferior frontal junction (r) 34 7 30 3.37
Posterior intraparietal
sulcus (r)
25 56 30 3.53
Posterior middle temporal
gyrus (r)
49 56 6 3.72
Cerebellum (l) 29 62 39 3.63
Corrected for multiple comparisons at z ¼ 1.96.
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trial history leads to an equal probability (and expectation)
of error trials on each correct trial. The argument of unex-
pectedness by trial history is thus somewhat weakened. In
a similar vein, another study on error observation investi-
gated whether the ERN component would be superim-
posed on a P300 component for unexpectedness [Miltner
et al., 2004]. The fact that error trials did not elicit a P300
was interpreted as an indication that the ERN could not
be rooted in the unexpectedness of errors [Miltner et al.,
2004]. This argument, however, rests on the assumption
that the P300 signals unexpectedness and the ERN does
not, an account that has been challenged [Croft et al.,
2003]. Interestingly, the reverse pattern—a P300 toward
observed errors but no ERN - has been reported [de Bruijn,
et al., 2007]. This study on the observation of erroneous
actions did in fact establish a P300 correlate toward unex-
pected observed errors, but no ERN. The authors interpret
their P300 finding as an indication of the unexpectedness of
errors, challenging the previously reported results.
Localizing Observed Error Responses
If fMRI results are to inform ERP measures and vice
versa, it is desirable to map an ERP to a corresponding
anatomically specified BOLD increase. An elegant
approach that used concurrent fMRI and ERP measures
did locate a source for the ERN in the RCZ [Debener
et al., 2005] at x ¼ 0, y ¼ 17, z ¼ 42, Talairach coordinates.
The considerable Euclidian difference to our peak voxel (x
¼ 7, y ¼ 37, z ¼ 39) renders analogies inconclusive.
Another valid approach to allow inferences between ERPs
and anatomy is to use the same paradigm in an fMRI and
ERP study and to compare the results as Wessel and col-
leagues did. Their task allowed comparing the BOLD
response and ERP components (ERN and N2) toward
unexpected events, such as errors and novel events (odd-
balls). The ensuing comparison established that the BOLD
activity in the RCZ, the ERN, and the N2 was closely
related and could all be explained substantially by the
unexpectedness of an event. To recuperate, the analysis
we conducted in an ROI which previously featured in
error-observation research [de Bruijn et al., 2009] led us to
conclude that even the unexpectedness of correct actions
activates this ROI (as well as the unexpectedness of errors)
and suggests that the correctness of an observed action
does not interact with the unexpectedness signal in this
ROI. Future research needs to determine whether the same
holds true for the associated ERN.
Unexpectedness and Model Adaptation
The identification of the RCZ as an area activated by
unexpectedness gains substantial support from the litera-
ture [Alexander and Brown, 2011; Beckmann et al., 2009].
Although our work does not dissociate other aspects of
committed errors, it does contribute evidence for unexpect-
edness effects in the specific area. This unexpectedness sig-
nal has been related not only to unexpected outcomes, but
also to the omission of an expected outcome [Alexander
and Brown, 2011]. This account is close to the concept of an
unexpectedly omitted error, as in this study (in unexpected
correct actions). Functionally, the unexpectedness signal
was suggested to prompt the adjustment of an internal for-
ward model (e.g., of an action) [Holroyd et al., 2009; Ull-
sperger et al., 2004]. A similar interpretation was put
forward in a number of articles concerning the involvement
of the medial BA 8 in decisions under uncertainty [Volz
et al., 2003, 2004, 2005]. Subjective uncertainty can be
regarded as the result of an objective accumulation of unex-
pected events [Friston, 2010; Luce, 2003]. Thus, the results
of this study dovetail with an account of adaptation of in-
ternal forward models driven by an unexpectedness signal
in the dorsal RCZ. Moreover, this study indicates that the
internal forward model that is adapted is not necessarily
that of the action in the sense of a motor model, but can
relate to an anticipated perception. Participants in both our
studies learnt to expect that a specific knot would be tied
incorrectly but they did not unlearn the tying of the knot.
This result extends the view proposed previously that cor-
relates of the observed errors influence observational learn-
ing (e.g., Schie et al., 2004). These accounts focused on the
adaptation of the observed action, not on the adaption of
the expectation of the performance of the observed action.
Adaptation of internal forward models is closely associ-
ated with a type of error that has so far not received due to
attention in this discussion: the prediction error. Prediction
errors are defined as mismatches between anticipated and
actual sensory input (for reviews, see Bubic et al., 2010;
Clark, 2012; Friston, 2010). The occurrence of prediction
errors incites the adaptation of internal forward models.
Importantly, unexpectedness, or surprise [Friston, 2010]
captures the same phenomenon: a sensory input not in line
with the brain’s current predictions. To recuperate: Based
on the presented data, we have argued the case that activity
in the mPFC toward observed errors can be driven by these
observed errors’ unexpectedness. The fact that unexpectedly
correct movies activate the same area shows that unexpect-
edness alone can cause this activation. Bringing together
these accounts of prediction errors in perception and unex-
pectedness, we suggest that unexpected events represent
errors in the internal forward model. Very speculatively,
the RCZ or mPFC may thus be involved in coding for the
necessity of adaptation when internal models fail. Be that
internal forward models of perception, or even action,
when the agent’s own errors are involved [Friston, 2010]. If
the contrast of errors within unexpected movies had led to
a significant activation in the RCZ, this would have chal-
lenged this interpretation, as the observation of unexpected
errors should NOT lead to more adaptation than observa-
tion of unexpected correct actions. However, this contradict-
ing evidence was not obtained.
A very interesting finding regarding the adaptation of
an internal forward model is the possible activation of the
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habenula (Supporting Information Table 1), a part of the
epithalamus. The habenula has often been described as
signaling for punishment, or worse-than-expected out-
comes [Hikosaka et al., 2008; Matsumoto and Hikosaka,
2007, 2009]. However, we could repeatedly establish habe-
nula activation toward deviations from an internal for-
ward model that were free of intrinsic valence [Schiffer
and Schubotz, 2011; Schiffer et al., 2012]. Moreover, both
observed errors [de Bruijn et al., 2009] and uncertainty
[Volz et al., 2003] may entail activation of the habenula.
Especially, the putative activation in the observed errors
study is interesting, as the observed errors encompassed
errors of the other agent which the observer sometimes
benefitted from. Thus, they had an (observed) error quality
and possibly an unexpectedness component—but penalty
effects were balanced. Importantly, the habenula has the
capacity of modulating midbrain dopaminergic output
[Hikosaka et al., 2008; Matsumoto and Hikosaka, 2007]
and dopamine in turn has been related to the guidance by
versus switching away from an internal model in percep-
tion [Friston, 2012]. Thus, the deviation signal in the habe-
nula may be involved in the dopaminergic modulation
necessary to adjust internal forward models.
CONCLUSIONS
The dorsal RCZ, bordering BA 8, is associated with the
unexpectedness of observed events, be they errors or not.
This finding extends to an ROI previously implicated sepa-
rately in coding for unexpected events, observation of errors,
and the generation of the ERN. Hence, this unexpectedness
account seems more parsimonious than a previous error-
mirror-neuron account. It deserves further experimental
scrutiny whether unexpectedness, as a sign of a failing
internal forward model, draws on the same resources as error
coding. Not last because a recent study has discovered
separate neuronal populations in the monkey SMA: one
seemingly coding for unexpected erroneous actions and one
for unexpected outcomes [Yoshida et al., 2012].
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